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SECULAR SECTARIANISM,
PERILOUS NEUTRALITY
Aviam Soifer*
Sandy Levinson's highly original consideration of attachment, and of various
leaps of faith-secular as well as religious-repeatedly has illuminated matters
about which few of us feel neutral. His scholarship directly engages core issues
that tend to be hard fought-fraught with the danger of encountering and perhaps
even becoming true believers. Sandy's impressive work is even deeply
provocative regarding what may be contemporary forms of idolatry.
At first glance, for example, neutrality seems appealing and safe. (This is the
case notwithstanding what we have learned in recent years about the conduct of
Switzerland during the World War II period.) If I read Sandy correctly, however,
he points out that the search for neutrality is necessarily quixotic in the context of
public space. Legitimacy inscribed via monuments and landscapes inescapably
involves the manipulation of a scarce, contested resource. Yet-to push Sandy's
point a bit further-it may be that the very concept of neutrality in law tends to
transmogrify detachment into a dangerous, not to say idolatrous, faith. I will
suggest at least that recent United States Supreme Court constitutional decisions
concerning religion serve to emphasize the perils of neutrality for secular and
religious people alike.
I. FIRST COURSE: CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE,
RELIGIOUS ANALOGIES, AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION
To Sandy Levinson, constitutional law is a linguistic system or discourse,
emphatically not written in stone.1 Throughout his career, Sandy has added
significantly to that discourse. In his hands, close attention to various forms of
constitutional faith becomes far richer than much of law talk and modern life,
neatly described by Clifford Geertz as "'marooned in a Beckett-world of colliding
soliloquy."' 2
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.
1. Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 191 (Princeton U. Press 1988) [hereinafter Levinson,
Constitutional Faith]. As to the meaning of what may not be settled, notwithstanding appearances, see
generally Sanford Levinson, Written in Stone: Public Monuments in Changing Societies (Duke U. Press
1998).
2. Quoted in Levinson, Constitutional Faith, supra n. 1, at 7.
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To think and to speak (and to listen carefully to others) concerning how we
think and talk about the federal constitution is to begin to ponder some basic
paradoxes. In Constitutional Faith, for example, Sandy offers a four cell diagram
of constitutional approaches: a person might be protestant or catholic about
textual limits; protestant or catholic about authority and concerning who gets to
define the "true Constitution." He also reminds us that James Madison suggested,
in Federalist 37, that in contemplating the Constitution, "'[i]t is impossible for a
man of pious reflection not to perceive in it, a finger of the Almighty hand ....
Yet given what the Supreme Court recently has had to say on the subject of the
Almighty and the Constitution, at times one wonders which finger the Almighty
might be lifting.
Sandy turns out to be someone who likes his paradoxes at least as much as
the next person. In fact, he probably agrees with Justice Holmes, at least in
Holmes's belief that "[t]here is nothing like a paradox to take the scum off [the]
mind."4 To begin, therefore, I focus on a paradox within what Sandy describes as
his "principal subject" in Constitutional Faith: that is "the implications of religious
analogies for understanding the role of the Constitution within the American civil
religion."5
It seems to me vitally important that we have a rich pluralism of many
constitutional faiths. This may explain why we constantly cast the Constitution in
various metaphors of rocks6 and roles. But I want to question some of the core
binary choices behind which we so often take refuge. These include the
attachment/detachment and evenhandedness/discrimination distinctions we tend
to demand of our judges, as well as key doctrinal dichotomies surrounding
church/state choices such as free exercise/establishment.
My central argument is that we should be much more dubious than we
generally are when "neutrality" is tossed around within constitutional doctrine or,
for that matter, in discourse about the Constitution. In particular, I will criticize
"neutrality" as the Court has embraced it in both recent Free Exercise and
Establishment Clause claims.
To introduce my approach, I begin with a striking bit of Talmud that is
relatively obscure even among those who-unlike myself-really know their
Talmud.7 It will suggest that even within what may seem to some to be the dark
heart of religious discourse, there may be no tiebreaker, no clear trump, no
neutral principles.
3. Id. at 14.
4. Holmes-Laski Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Harold J. Laski, 1916-
1935 vol. 1, at 389 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harv. U. Press 1953).
5. Levinson, Constitutional Faith, supra n. 1, at 27.
6. "Let he who cast the first stone" seems particularly apropos, but consider, e.g., foundations,
bedrock, and similar metaphors, discussed with wisdom in Milner S. Ball, Lying Down Together: Law,
Metaphor, and Theology (U. Wis. Press 1985).
7. I should note that I am very grateful to Sandy for including me in one of the wonderful,
weeklong Talmud study sessions for American law professors held at the Hartman Institute in
Jerusalem a number of years ago.
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Next, I briefly consider recent Supreme Court invocations of neutrality in
the realm in which neutrality might seem most obviously appealing and most
important: the area of church-state relations governed by the First Amendment's
Religion Clauses. The Supreme Court's recent "shift to neutral, '8 I suggest,
constitutes an important departure from established constitutional doctrine. On
both the free exercise and establishment sides of the ledger, the Court has
emphasized neutrality in all the wrong places. In fact, a majority of the Justices
has begun to enact an extreme departure from past constitutional faiths. This
initiative entails significant new threats to freedom of conscience and a serious
menace for religion, as well as for government. The dangers now lurking are
indeed of the sort that demonstrably concerned James Madison, Thomas
Jefferson, and their peers, as well as numerous thinkers (and judges) before and
since.
By focusing on several deep problems within the linked concepts of
neutrality and nondiscrimination, I suggest that what the Court is doing now
directly undermines the guarantee of "full and equal rights of conscience." That
was the phrase for the freedoms James Madison championed in the First Congress
in his draft for what became the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.9 The
current Supreme Court's lack of concern about craftsmanship, coupled with its
extreme result orientation, actually is doing far more to "court anarchy" than
would any serious, robust version of free exercise protections. 10 Contrary to what
the current majority led by Chief Justice Rehnquist insists, moreover, the wall of
separation embedded in the Establishment Clause is not some passing metaphor
Thomas Jefferson dreamed up for political purposes one fine day when he sat
down to write to the Danbury Baptists in 1791. As Roger Williams put the matter
almost 150 years before Jefferson wrote, great vigilance is required if there is any
"gap in the hedge or wall of separation between the garden of the church and the
wilderness of the world ...
In closing, I hint at a better approach to the knotty, fascinating, and
inevitable tension within the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. Analogies
drawn from some of the basics of our secular faith, from the way we regulate the
process of voting, could prove helpful in thinking about law and religion.
8. For an .important discussion about these recent developments, see Symposium, Shifting into
Neutral? Emerging Perspectives on the Separation of Church and State, 43 B.C. L. Rev. 1009 (2002).
9. This is discussed in Aviam Soifer, Full and Equal Rights of Conscience, 22 U. Haw. L. Rev. 469
(2000).
10. In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
888 (1990), Justice Scalia expressed concern that to apply the established compelling state interest test
to alleged intrusions on the free exercise of religion was "courting anarchy."
11. Roger Williams, Mr. Cotton[']s Letter Lately Printed, Examined and Answered, in Perry Miller,
Roger Williams: His Contribution to the American Tradition 89, 98 (Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1953). For
a different view of the implications of the metaphor and many other matters, see Philip Hamburger,
Separation of Church and State (Harv. U. Press 2002). But see Noah Feldman, From Liberty to
Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 673 (2002).
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II. A TALMUDIC INTERLUDE
Talmudic law does not fit neatly within Sandy Levinson's topography of
religion and law.' 2 If anything, however, the unsettled and unsettling thrust of the
following section of the Babylonian Talmud illustrates the complexity of the
categories Sandy so usefully has begun to explore. Even a tentative glance reveals
intriguingly challenging, destabilizing possibilities.
This little-known and strange little story in the Talmud involves Rabbah bar
Nahmani, introduced as someone who "died as a result of persecution, having
been informed against to the authorities.0 3 The scene opens with Rabbah, seated
alone on a palm tree stump, studying the Torah. "At that very time," we learn,
"there was a dispute in the Heavenly Academy about a certain matter concerning
the disease of leprosy .... ,14 The controversy was about whether the priest
should declare someone ritually pure or not, depending on whether a spot of a
certain size or a white hair appeared first. The narrow question is what to do if
there is a doubt, i.e., if it is unclear whether the spot or the hair appeared first. We
are told that "The Holy One, blessed be He, says that in such a case the afflicted
person is still ritually pure."'5  Many would think that this should decide the
matter. The problem was, however, that all the Sages of the Heavenly Academy
maintained that in such a case, the afflicted person is impure. Even God's vote
was not trump. What to do?
It was agreed in Heaven that Rabbah bar Nahmani should be summoned to
decide between the two views. (Rabbah previously had claimed great expertise on
the subject of leprosy and purity.) Initially, however, the Angel of Death could
not grab Rabbah because Rabbah was so deeply absorbed in his learning that he
did not interrupt his studies for even a moment. Then the wind was made to howl
between the branches of the trees near Rabbah. Distracted, he mistook the sound
of the wind for a troop of horsemen and proclaimed that he would rather die than
be captured and turned over to the authorities. As Rabbah died, he ruled on the
matter and his last words were, "'It is pure, it is pure."",16 A heavenly voice
proclaimed, "Happy are you, Rabbah bar Nahmani, that your body is pure and
your soul departed in purity with the word 'pure' on your lips."' 7
12. In a footnote, for example, Sandy not only concedes that his use of "protestant" and "catholic"
may be overly schematic, but also that his own predilection leaning toward a "'catholic-protestant'
perspective-the joinder of a non-text-identified Constitution with a rejection of judicial supremacy-
undoubtedly come from its similarity to the historical development of what I find the most attractive
aspects of Judaism." Levinson, Constitutional Faith, supra n. 1, at 209 n. 161.
13. The Talmud: The Steinsaltz Edition, Volume V Tractate Bava Metzia Part V, at 148 (Random
House 1992) [hereinafter The Talmud: The Steinsaltz Edition]. The charge was that 12,000 Jews did
not pay the royal poll tax because they were off at Rabbah's lectures before key Jewish holidays. The
Talmud recounts a series of cat-and-mouse adventures as Rabbah moved from town to town, pursued
by a royal officer. With the aid of strange happenings, including a wall that collapsed to save Rabbah
in answer to his prayers, Rabbah made his escape. Id. at 148-49.
14. Id. at 149.
15. Id. at 150..
16. Id. at 151.
17. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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We are told that over the next few days three notes dropped from Heaven.
The first announced that Rabbah had been summoned to the Heavenly Academy;
the next two instructed the rabbis as to how long they were obliged to eulogize
Rabbah and when they could go home without being subject to a ban. The story
ends with an unnamed Arab riding a camel, who is blown from one side of the
Pappa River to the other. When the unnamed Arab (understandably) asks what is
happening here, he discovers that the great sage Rabbah died, at which point the
Arab offers fulsome praise of both God and Rabbah, "[who] is Yours, whether he
is in this world or in the world to come. '1 8 But why destroy the world, the Arab
asks, on account of Rabbah's death? As a result of the Arab's appeal, we are told,
the storm subsides.
Certainly this story is weird enough on its own terms. But it becomes even
more intriguing. According to the rabbis, the more permissive answer to the
purity question-the view that, when in doubt, the person whose symptoms are
uncertain is presumed to be ritually pure-has not prevailed as a matter of
halakhah (Jewish religious law). 9 Majority rule actually rejects the more liberal
position, i.e., the interpretation adopted by both God and Rabbah. No less a
commentator than Maimonides asserted that the matter remains in doubt. To
make this claim, Maimonides invoked a familiar trope, insisting that the Torah
was given to human beings on earth and is not in Heaven. Therefore, the Torah is
to be interpreted by majority rule among human experts, and not even by the
views of Heaven.20 A majority of experts have been stricter than Maimonides.
Remarkably, they have decided against the more permissive position, though the
Talmud is clear that the position they reject is the position embraced by God and
Rabbah.zl
As a result of an informal sampling, I believe this story from the Talmud is
not well known, even among Orthodox Jews, probably because it seems so
blatantly subversive. At the very least, the idea that God's view is not
determinative appears to be a striking, deconstructing illustration of the
independence of judges within Jewish law. That the view shared by God and
Rabbah does not prevail emphasizes the degree to which there is no Archimedean
point, at least within the contours of this section of the Talmud. The inadequacy
of neutral principles is obvious here as well, as is the lack of any settled prior law
that could control the current dispute. z By embracing the absence of such
benchmarks-even within the context of religious law-the Talmud here seems to
18. The Talmud: The Steinsaltz Edition, supra n. 13, at 152.
19. Id. at 150 (Halakhah Note).
20. The Talmud: The Steinsaltz Edition, Volume III Tractate Bava Metzia Part III, at 235-40
(Random House 1992) (Ovens of Akhnai). For first-rate discussions of this intriguing and complex
story, see Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Akhnai, 1997 Utah L. Rev. 309; Suzanne Last Stone, In Pursuit of
the Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model in Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106
Harv. L. Rev. 813 (1993).
21. The Talmud: The Steinsaltz Edition, supra n. 13, at 150 (Halakhah Note).
22. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959).
Charles L. Black, Jr., offered a justly famous, devastating response, directly rooted in facts on the
ground, in Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 Yale L.J. 421 (1960).
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point to a radically open-ended, future-oriented approach to judging and to law
itself. On earth and in Heaven, there is no neutral place.
A more familiar Jewish folk tale concerning judges and judgment makes a
similar point, albeit in a very different tone. In a small village, two men come to a
rabbi's home to ask him to decide their small dispute. The rabbi listens to the first
man, and says, "You're right." After hearing the claims of the other party, the
rabbi again says, "You're right." Overhearing all this, the rabbi's wife summons
the rabbi into the next room and scolds him. She vigorously points out that the
parties cannot both be right. "You're right," says the rabbi.
At first glance, the rabbi in this story (or joke) may seem a complete fool.
The more closely we consider his role in comparison to other judges, however, the
more we might begin to hope to have such a judge if we must appear in court. He
listens and he empathizes. He is open-minded. He adjusts to context. He is
hardly a hidebound formalist and he understands that determining who is right
may be more significant than any reified notion of the law. For a judge, an astute
sense of complexity and the future may be preferable to either true belief or faith
in the past.23 There must be human judgment, to be sure, but it takes wisdom and
attention to the future as well as to the past if the job is to be done well. Simple
binary choices and claims of extrahuman authority do not produce results even
approaching justice. If nothing else, both the Talmud's story about a heavenly
dispute and the earthy folktale indicate how complex, and important, the very idea
of neutrality turns out to be when we get down to cases.
III. SHIFTING INTO NEUTRAL
Neutral in law is different from neutral in a car. In driving a car, finding
neutral is really quite mechanical. You've got it in gear or you do not; you are
either in or out of neutral. Unfortunately, the current Court has begun to wield a
similarly mechanistic conception of neutrality as it construes both of the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment. On one hand, the Court has begun to insist that
Free Exercise Clause protections are irrelevant so long as government officials do
not act in a way intended to punish or harm religion.24 On the other, most of the
same Justices insist that to exclude religion from participation in various public
25programs is a form of unconstitutional discrimination. Moreover, government
23. I think I love these stories-one from the heights of the Talmud and the other from the lowly
daily life of the shtetl-because I may be more skeptically anarchic than Sandy is. The great Jewish
scholar Gershom Scholem, after being pressed by his friend Walter Benjamin to explain why Scholem
resolutely resisted commitment to Zionism or to some specific form of Jewish worship, explained that
he was committed 'to maintain[ing] the anarchic suspension."' Susan A. Handleman, Fragments of
Redemption: Jewish Thought and Literary Theory in Benjamin, Scholem, and Levinas 56 (Ind. U. Press
1991). Scholem observed: "'[I]t is precisely the wealth of contradictions, of differing views, which is
encompassed and unqualifiedly affirmed by tradition."' Levinson, Constitutional Faith, supra n. 1, at
20. Like my late friend Bob Cover, at times I think of myself as somewhat of an anarchist who still
loves law. For a brief discussion of admirable judicial choices made among competing institutional
values, see Aviam Soifer, Rethinking Fairness: Principled Legal Realism and Federal Jurisdiction, 46
N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 29 (2002-03).
24. Smith, 494 U.S. 872.
25. Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
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aid to religion now has become constitutionally acceptable, so long as that aid is
laundered through what the Court perceives as a "genuine and independent
private choice.
2 6
A. Free Exercise and Viewpoint Neutrality
There can be no doubt that these innovative interpretations both the
Religion Clauses mark a major departure from decades worth of the Court's own
precedents. In the name of neutrality, the Court sloppily abandoned over forty
years of Free Exercise precedents in Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith,27 for example. And even when a Free Exercise
claim prevails in the post-Smith world, as the Santeria religious argument did in
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., v. City of Hialeah,5 discrimination has
become the focal point for the Court's inquiry.29  To assess the requisite
constitutional neutrality, the Court now says it finds "guidance in our equal
protection cases.,
30
The appealing idea of nondiscrimination has deep roots, of course, within
traditional analysis of freedom of expression claims. The Court also has begun to
rely on the inherent appeal of "viewpoint neutrality" as a useful freedom of
expression bridge between its parsimonious free exercise decisions and its recent
holdings gutting the Establishment Clause in the name of aggressive "neutrality."
Long gone is the longstanding recognition-in the context of early school prayer
decisions, for instance-that: "Neither the fact that the prayer may be
denominationally neutral nor the fact that its observance on the part of the
students is voluntary can serve to free it from the limitations of the Establishment
Clause, as it might from the Free Exercise Clause .... ,,3
In Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 2 for example, the Court
decided that a public school could not exclude an evangelical Christian club from
an after school program aimed at elementary students. Justice Thomas's opinion
for the majority held that the exclusion of even a proselytizing club constituted an
unconstitutional form of viewpoint discrimination. Thomas repeatedly extolled
the virtues-and constitutional clout-of neutrality. In fact, he scolded the
26. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2467 (2002).
27. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
28. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
29. Id. at 533. Justice Kennedy's lead opinion for the unanimous Court emphasized: "At a
minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates against
some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious
reasons." Id. at 532. Justice Souter, concurring, made a thoughtful argument that distinguished
between formal and facial neutrality and also pointed out that substantive neutrality may be something
far different in the context of the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 561-63 (Souter, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). See generally Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated
Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DePaul L. Rev. 933 (1990). (It probably bears noting that Laycock
argued the case before the Supreme Court for the Santeria church.).
30. Church of the Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540.
31. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) (invalidating New York state's "non-denominational"
prayer).
32. 533 U.S. 98.
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defendants and particularly the lower courts in the case for their exaggerated
Establishment Clause concerns. He also manipulated the usual rules that govern
summary judgments in order to avoid confronting facts that supported
Establishment Clause concerns, which he reduced to an unsympathetic,
unconstitutional caricature: attempts to limit religious expression in public settings
are now "a modified heckler's veto. 3 3 Justice Scalia's concurrence went further in
denigrating separation of church and state sensitivity. The case involved "zero"
Establishment Clause issues, according to Scalia.34 He went on to claim, even
though the case involved children of elementary school age who were offered
candy and other treats to attend club sessions, that giving candy to a child simply
triggers that child's free choice. Scalia observed, "Physical coercion is not at issue
here; and so-called 'peer pressure,' if it can ever be considered coercion, is, when it
arises in private activities, one of the attendant consequences of a freedom of
association that is constitutionally protected ....
In the last few years, the Court also has taken the complex, entangled issues
of the Establishment Clause and reduced them to a largely formulaic inquiry: (1)
Is there genuine and independent private choice? and (2) Can government aid be
considered neutral because it passes through an adequate buffer before it reaches
religious institutions? The foundation for this approach was solidly in place
before the Cleveland school voucher decision, as was the counterargument that
there actually are many different meanings of neutrality within Establishment
Clause analysis.36 Yet Zelman v. Simmons-Harris37 erected a formidable and
33. Id. at 119. A year earlier, Thomas began to develop this theme when he wrote for a plurality in
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (upholding federal program funneling funds via state
educational agencies to local educational bodies, which in turn lend items such as library materials and
computers to both public and private schools). Thomas argued in Mitchell that "hostility to aid to
pervasively sectarian schools has a shameful pedigree that we do not hesitate to disavow." 530 U.S. at
828. After mentioning Congress's near passage of the Blaine Amendment in the 1870s, Thomas
proclaimed that a doctrine that excluded pervasively sectarian schools from otherwise permissible
public aid was "born of bigotry" and "should be buried now." Id. at 829.
34. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 121 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
35. Id. Parental consent forms were required, but the Court precluded inquiry about the context
and reliability of such consent. Nor did the majority Justices explore the problematic role of teachers,
assigned to supervise but not to influence their young charges as to after school program content.
Moreover, neither the appeal of candy to a hungry youngster at the end of a school day nor the suasion
of a young child's friendships figured in the Court's analysis. Finally, there are potentially devastating
implications in importing viewpoint neutrality analysis into an after school program setting. If the
Court really means that this limited public forum-a point assumed rather than litigated in the case-
is to be treated as if it were a public auditorium, for example, it would seem that any group, no matter
how controversial, now can claim constitutional access to a school's after school program. Rather than
allow use of a classroom by some Ku Klux Klan or gay rights or socialist youth group, for example, one
can readily foresee a school board choosing to close down an entire program. In part thanks to the
Supreme Court itself, even Scout troops have become controversial. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale,
530 U.S. 640 (2000).
36. For example, Mitchell v. Helms, discussed at supra note 33, embraces a version of neutrality and
private choices that directly anticipates Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in the voucher case.
See e.g. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 811-14. Justice Souter's extensive dissent in Mitchell includes a helpful
typology of three different meanings of "neutrality" within Establishment Clause analysis. These
include: (1) a conclusory description of a state of equipoise for government, functioning as neither ally
nor adversary of religion; (2) a synonym for secular, nonideological, or not related to religious
education; and (3) evenhandedness. Id. at 878 (Souter, J., dissenting).
37. 122 S. Ct. 2460.
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remarkably formal bulwark that now protects extensive government aid to
religious institutions from constitutional attack.
B. Choices, Not Echoes
During the Depression, many states and corporations launched a fierce
constitutional attack against the new Social Security system. With some
justification, they claimed that states were left with little true choice. They
pointed out, for example, that the new-fangled federal unemployment
compensation scheme offered a ninety percent federal tax credit for employers,
but that to receive it those employers had to make contributions to state
unemployment funds which the federal government had certified were in
compliance with the Social Security Act.
Writing for a five-to-four majority, Justice Cardozo upheld this element of
the federal Social Security Act.38  He rejected the claim of unconstitutional
coercion made by the states. To conflate temptation with coercion, Cardozo
argued, would "plunge the law in endless difficulties."39  Rejecting "a
philosophical determinism by which choice becomes impossible," Cardozo
endorsed the tradition of a "robust common sense which assumes the freedom of
the will as a working hypothesis in the solution" of legal problems.4 °
It is worth noting that less than two months before Steward Machine, the
Court had handed down its famous West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish41 decision
upholding the State of Washington's minimum wage law for women. In West
Coast Hotel, the Court rejected decades of federal court interventions made in the
name of freedom of contract. Instead of following the Court's substantive due
process precedents, Chief Justice Hughes's majority opinion underscored how
greatly the inequality of bargaining power faced by many workers rendered their
free choices nugatory, thus making their wages, hours, and working conditions
appropriate subjects for legislative intervention.42
Old constitutional law chestnuts such as Steward Machine and West Coast
Hotel underscore how bitterly ironic it is that, in recent years, the Court has
tended to turn the Court's core assumptions in 1937 entirely upside down. Today
the majority has become extremely solicitous of the knowing and voluntary
choices of the states. If a state makes a bad deal, for example, the Court is often
quite willing to let the state out of the obligations for which the state contracted.43
Indeed, the very unfairness of the deal the state made-at least in hindsight-may
be enough to allow the state to get out from under all its legal obligations.
38. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
39. Id. at 590.
40. Id.
41. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
42 Id. at 398-99.
43. See Pennhurst St. Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, 23-27 (1981); N.Y. v. U.S., 505 U.S.
144, 174-77 (1992); Barnes v. Gorman, 122 S. Ct. 2097, 2101-02 (2002).
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Simultaneously, however, the Court is quite cavalier in assuming that
individuals are bound by agreements they have reached, no matter how limited
their options at the time nor how extreme the extenuating circumstances might
have been.44 Less than a fully knowing and voluntary undertaking of legal
obligations carries little weight for unrepresented individuals, though the same
argument is often a clear winner for states whose many lawyers did not save them
from themselves.45
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the Zelman majority is so repetitiously
and emphatically enthusiastic about the "true private choice" it discerns. Despite
the backdrop of a failed public school system and the considerable monetary
discrepancies among the few available options, Chief Justice Rehnquist is certain
that the parents freely chose to send their children to religious schools. Under the
program's eligibility criteria, the parents involved must be impoverished. Yet they
made "genuine and independent private choices, 46 for example, through which
nearly two-thirds of the parents sent their children to the religious schools of
religions different from the religions they embrace 7
This "genuine and independent private choice" also serves the majority as
the crucial buffer establishing the requisite constitutional neutrality. Because
parents select the religious schools, "the circuit between government and religion"
is broken, "and the Establishment Clause... not implicated.
'4 8
Therefore, Rehnquist's syllogism has it, "Any objective observer familiar
with the full history and context of the Ohio program would reasonably view it as
44. Dept. of Housing & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002). In Rucker, public housing
leases required tenants to "assure that the tenant, any member of the household, a guest, or another
person under the tenant's control, shall not engage in ... any drug-related criminal activity on or near
the premises." Id. at 128. The tenants also signed agreements providing that the tenant "understands
that if I or any member of my household or guests should violate this lease provision, my tenancy may
be terminated and I may be evicted." Id. Four long-term tenants were found to have violated the lease
provision and the housing authority began eviction proceedings. Id. The tenants obtained an
injunction, which the Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 136. Two of the tenants had grandchildren who
were caught smoking marijuana in the parking lot; another tenant's daughter was found with a crack
pipe and crack cocaine three blocks from the apartment complex. Id. at 128. The fourth tenant was
disabled; his caregiver and two associates of the caregiver were found with cocaine in the tenant's
apartment. Id.
45. Compare e.g. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 323-24 (1971) (welfare recipient has right to refuse
home visit by caseworker, at cost of benefits) and Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 726-27 (1980)
(juvenile, aged sixteen and a half, in police custody knowingly and voluntarily waived Miranda rights
when he tearfully asked for probation officer, not lawyer) with U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 653-54
(2000) (Violence Against Women Act held invalid on federalism grounds despite facts that-as Justice
Souter pointed out in a dissent joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer-over two-thirds of
all states supported the Act and over two-thirds joined an amicus curiae brief urging the Court to
uphold the Act); Alden v. Me., 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (dignity of state sovereignty precludes Congress's
authority to provide remedies for federal rights in nonconsenting state courts); N. Y., 505 U.S. at 182-83
(principles of federalism invalidate federal law even if there is state consent).
46. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2465.
47. Id. at 2494-95 (Souter, J., dissenting). Souter also makes the point that the majority's criterion
for true free choice cannot actually screen anything out. Id. at 2494. For the parents, what is clearly a
Hobson's choice actually may have been made in the context of a nasty and short Hobbesian choice
within an unforgiving range of brutish options.
48. Id. at 2467 (following Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 501 U.S. 1 (1993)). In the old
hymn, "the circle is unbroken." In the Court's view, however, the government and religion circuit is
quite easily torn asunder.
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one aspect of a broader undertaking to assist poor children in failed schools, not as
an endorsement of religious schooling in general., 49 It hardly seems coincidental
that this standard seems to echo the permissive standard familiar in assessing
rationality within equal protection adjudication. The majority's bottom line in
Zelman determines that the challenged program is "entirely neutral" with respect
to religion, and it is "a program of true private choice.,
50
Religious schools ought to beware.
C. Discretionary Neutrality: Perilous Ground for Religious Groups
The Zelman majority is unconcerned about the strings attached when
religious schools accept vouchers under the Ohio program. But those who run
religious schools should worry about much more than their increased exposure to
general state educational regulations. First, in order to receive vouchers under the
plan, religious schools must agree to abide by the state's civil rights statutes,
including prohibitions against discrimination "on the basis of... religion.,
51
Moreover, the religious schools must agree not to teach "hatred of any person or
group on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion. 52  The
possibilities are obvious for politically charged state entanglement. There may
well be tendentious disputes over when the common "choseness," the "us" and
"them" of a good deal of religious belief may blur into "teaching hatred," at least
within the perception of a disgruntled student, parent, or teacher or a taxpayer
unsympathetic with the teachings of a particular religion. Finally, the religious
schools are forbidden to "advocate or foster unlawful behavior,, 53 a prohibition
that, for example, would have cramped both the style and the message of many of
the Freedom Schools during the civil rights movement. Indeed, the religious
schools of many denominations seek to educate students to challenge laws they
regard as immoral and unconscionable.
There are more basic problems facing religions within the current Court's
general approach. The first is that religions change, of course, and the availability
of public funding has a way of altering what previously appeared to be deeply held
religious beliefs. James Madison pointed this out in his famous Memorial and
49. Id. at 2469. The majority's variation on the "objective observer" approach to Establishment
Clause issues, generally associated with Justice O'Connor, seems to render this theoretical "objective
observer" someone indistinguishable from the Justices' understanding of themselves.
50. Id. at 2473.
51. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.976(A)(4) (West Supp. 2002). This would seem to prohibit using
religion as a criterion for hiring teachers, for example. Another Ohio statute prohibits the use of
religion as a criterion for admissions under the voucher plan. For clear and insightful guidance through
this tangled area, see Martha Minow, Partners, Not Rivals: Privatization and the Public Good 80-93
(Beacon Press 2002). Minow maintains that "public values," such as a commitment to
nondiscrimination, should be made to follow public dollars "even when private providers address
public needs." Id. at 105.
52. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § '3313.976(A)(7). It is significant, of course, that Ohio's
nondiscrimination statute does not cover gender or sexual orientation, but it is likely that other
jurisdictions may reach such discrimination and that such coverage will cause difficulties for the hiring
practices of Orthodox Jews and observant Catholics, for example.
53. Id.
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Remonstrance,54 for example, and the Mormon Church found itself tightly
squeezed into compliance with federal laws against polygamy.5 More recently,
the Supreme Court has faced religious claims that morphed in the context of
56
available public resources and litigation.
Almost surely more immediately significant, however, is consideration of the
kind of judicial review that the Supreme Court actually has applied in deciding
cases that allege that government decisionmakers have failed to be neutral in
making their decisions. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc.,57 provides a vivid illustration of what turns out to be a widespread
phenomenon. Under an executive order, federal employees may use pledge cards
to designate contributions they wished to make to specified non-profits during an
annual charitable fundraising drive. When legal defense and political advocacy
organizations were excluded from participating in the charity .drive directed at
federal employees, the organizations challenged the exclusion. Though the lower
courts found the exclusion unreasonable, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion
rejected the organizations' claims.
She first determined that the entire charity drive, the Combined Federal
Campaign, was the relevant forum, and then decided that the exclusion of the
organizations "need only be reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the
only reasonable limitation. ''58 By subdividing the general classification containing
charities, the Court was able to claim that it saw no viewpoint discrimination. The
scheme was neutral enough to satisfy the Court.59
There are important implications within the Court's approach in such cases
for the inclusion and exclusion of particular religious groups from government
funding in "faith-based initiatives" and similar programs. In recent years, the
Court repeatedly has stressed in the context of equal protection that legislators
and government officials need not be completely neutral. Even if it costs
54. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance (Isaiah Thomas 1786) (available in Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 63 (1947)).
55. The story of the Mormon Church is told well in Sarah Barringer Gordon, The Mormon
Question: Polygamy and Constitutional Conflict in Nineteenth-Century America (U. N.C. Press 2002).
56. See e.g. Bob Jones U. v. U.S., 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (university lost tax-exempt status under
Internal Revenue Code despite its changing but still restrictive policies against interracial dating); Bd.
of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (allowing restriction on mixing
gender to be relaxed in the context of funding for special needs children). Bob Jones University later
further changed its policies. See Page Ivey, S.C. School Drops Interracial Dating Ban Controversy: In
Wake of Criticism Sparked by Bush Visit, Bob Jones University Changes Its Rule, L.A. Times A9 (Mar.
5, 2000) (available in 2000 WL 2216894).
57. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
58. Id. at 808 (emphasis in original).
59. The Court similarly upheld discretionary line-drawing between groups, for example, in a
different First Amendment context in Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S.
540 (1983). Stressing that for these purposes advantageous tax treatment and government largess
generally are indistinguishable, then-Justice Rehnquist's opinion for a unanimous Court applied
extremely deferential review. "It is also not irrational for Congress to decide that, even though it will
not subsidize substantial lobbying by charities generally, it will subsidize lobbying by veterans'
organizations," he wrote. Id. at 550. See e.g. Lyng v. Intl. Union, United Automobile, Aerospace &
Agric. Implement Workers of Am., UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 372-73 (1988) (ban on food stamps for strikers
or their families upheld as "rationally related to the stated objective of maintaining neutrality in private
labor disputes").
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taxpayers more money, state and federal legislators are free to subsidize
childbirth, for example, but not to pay for abortions.6°  Though individual
constitutional rights are embedded within the choices made, the Court repeatedly
has held that it does not violate principles of neutrality for politicians to pick and
choose among the groups they wish to favor with subsidies or tax breaks.
IV. NEUTRALITY RE-EXAMINED
A. The Problem
Neutrality is an appealing, simple-and wildly misleading-concept once we
begin to analyze it in constitutional law terms. Both first amendment and equal
protection analyses vividly illustrate the point. It seems particularly ill-advised to
attempt to hide the rapidly increasing intertwining of religion with government
benefits behind a faqade of neutrality that can hardly withstand a soft breeze, let
alone careful scrutiny.
Indeed, the very idea of "neutrality" turns out to be a prime example of how
"one could get out of a premise all that one had put into it."'61 As Tocqueville
went on to observe a long time ago, however, "Generally speaking, it is only the
simple conceptions which take hold of a people's mind., 62  Neutrality in law
repeatedly and to some extent necessarily entails such fuzziness as "benevolent
neutrality,, 63 to be sharply distinguished from "callous indifference." 64  That
fuzziness ought to concern us-particularly among those who care deeply about
constitutional protection for religious beliefs.
In addition to some of the analytic difficulties and the practical pitfalls
mentioned above, there are several other good potential reasons to be skeptical of
the current Court's neutrality stance:
First, religions tend to be hypersensitive about discrimination. At a basic
level, religious groups tend to challenge rather than to accept that all other
religious groups are similarly situated. The past strongly suggests, moreover, that
perceived and real discrimination almost surely will accompany any new
government subsidization of pervasively sectarian institutions.
Second, many religious people who now seek entrance or better access to the
public square are likely to find that it is hardly a quiet place that lends itself to civil
discourse among talkers and walkers. In fact, the breakdown of the old
separationism is likely to produce a very dangerous intersection. The collision of
rapidly moving religions and changing government concerns and capabilities may
prove very frightening, even if the intersection is within a no-fault jurisdiction.
60. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,480 (1977).
61. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 164 (J.P. Mayer ed., Doubleday 1969).
62. Id.
63. Walz v. Tax Commn. of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). Benevolent neutrality is not
synonymous with "benign neglect," however.
64. Grumet, 512 U.S. at 744 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)).
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Third, in matters religious and political, it may be that-in the words of the
old union song about Harlan County, Kentucky-"There are no neutrals there."
B. Refining the Problem
Rather than despair or become jaded about the entire enterprise, however, it
seems to make sense to circle back in the direction from which we started. To
catch up with neutrality, we may have to slow down and look within. For
example, shortly before he was murdered along with five other Jesuits, their
housekeeper and her daughter in El Salvador in 1989, psychologist and activist
Ignacio Martin-Bar6 observed: "Objectivity is not the same as impartiality with
regard to the processes that necessarily affect all of us. Thus... it is more useful
to become conscious of one's own involvements and interests than to deny them
and try to place oneself on a fictitious higher plane 'beyond good and evil.' 65
The constitutional and religious faiths that Sandy Levinson describes,
compares, and contrasts so provocatively tend to be little recognized but
ineluctable forces that embed judges and the rest of us willy-nilly, like it or not. If
we cannot escape, we still are wise to consider their profound, sometimes
unyielding impact upon ourselves as well as our fellows.
Sandy seems to embrace Clifford Geertz's observation that "all aspects of
social life are pervaded by decidedly non-neutral assumptions whose acceptance
by a member of the culture defines what is 'possible' for that person. ' 66 To explore
those possibilities within the contact zone between law and religion, it may prove
useful to take a peek at another legal realm.
C. Possible New Directions: Analogies from the Protection of Voting and
Campaigning
In particular, we might think about the Free Exercise Clause in terms of the
ways that we regulate polling places, 67 and the Establishment Clause could evoke
useful thoughts about the role of government vis-a-vis political speech.68 In the
tightly controlled realm of how we cast our votes, for example, we have made
great progress toward guaranteeing equal access to the ballot. Paradoxically, this
entails treating some voters unequally, including providing accommodations for
those who need it. On the other hand, even within the intensely contested and
largely uncontrolled world of political debate, the government must provide police
protection to avoid allowing a real heckler's veto. Yet it is also obvious that the
government may not put a thumb on the scale to subsidize one party or another,
nor may it even provide grants so that citizens will buy from a limited range of
65. Religion as an Instrument of Psychological Warfare, in Ignacio Martin-Bar6, Writings for a
Liberation Psychology 149-50 (Adrianne Aron & Shawn Corne eds., Harv. U. Press 1994).
66. Levinson, Constitutional Faith, supra n. 1, at 156 (emphasis in original).
67. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (upholding regulation of expression within one hundred
feet of polling station).
68. Compare e.g. C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 Harv. Civ. Rights-
Civ. Libs. L. Rev. 1 (1998) with Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 Utah L.
Rev. 311.
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newspapers or politicians' offerings. The government thus is directly involved
with protecting political speech and freedom of the press, but it nonetheless must
not try to wield influence in either realm. If government officials did try to
intervene, of course, few would maintain that citizens-as-buffers could cure such a
stark constitutional problem.
V. CONCLUSION
Charles L. Black, Jr., liked to describe law as "reasoning from
commitment."6 9 As Black did so vividly, Sandy Levinson effectively reminds us
that law ought to have a point. In interpreting some of the basics of our
constitutional law, we also would be wise to keep in mind Gershom Scholem's
complex and wise point that a legal tradition need not focus blindly on simple
authority. Rather, law actually can encompass and affirm a wealth of
contradictions and differing views. The Court's recent devotion to a rigid
formalism of false neutrality in construing the Religion Clauses does not even
satisfy minimal standards of reasoning and commitment. Both law and religion
deserve more.
69. Charles L. Black, Jr., A New Birth of Freedom: Human Rights, Named and Unnamed 5
(Grosset/Putnam 1997).
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